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Abstract 
While there has been some recent interest in the behavioural effects of policies in support of 
innovation networks, this research field is still relatively new. In particular, an important but 
under-researched question for policy design is “what kind of networks” should be supported, 
if the objective of the policy is not just to fund successful innovation projects, but also to 
stimulate behavioural changes in the participants, such as increasing their ability to engage in 
collaborative innovation. By studying the case of the innovation policy programmes 
implemented by the regional government of Tuscany, in Italy, between 2002 and 2008, we 
assess whether the imposition of constraints on the design of innovation networks has 
enhanced the participants’ collaborative innovation capabilities, and we draw some general 
implications for policy.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms’ ability to access knowledge through interactions with external organizations, 
including universities and other firms, is increasingly recognized as an important determinant 
of innovation capabilities (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2002; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; 
Laursen and Salter, 2004). In management theory, it has been suggested that, as technologies 
become more complex and economic environments more uncertain, firms increasingly rely 
upon external sources of knowledge to support their technological development (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). It has been observed that 
innovation activities have become more open and distributed, involving R&D collaborations, 
integration of different knowledge modules, transaction of intellectual property (Von Hippel, 
1988; Chesbrough, 2003). Studies of both organizations and individuals have emphasized the 
role of interactions among heterogeneous actors as key sources of innovation (Fonseca, 2002; 
Nooteboom, 2004). The complexity-inspired approach of Lane and Maxfield (1997) has 
highlighted the elements of such interactions that are associated with greater likelihood to 
generate innovations (“generative potential”, in these authors’ terminology) and to foster 
long-lasting relationships that give rise to innovation cascades.  
In parallel with the increasing interest in networks of innovation on the part of the academic 
literature, policymakers are also acknowledging the important systemic nature of innovation 
processes, involving many agents often engaged in networks of relationships (OECD, 1997; 
Mytelka and Smith, 2002; European Commission, 2003; Nauwelaers and Wintjes, 2008).  
For these reasons, alongside the more traditional types of interventions targeted at individual 
firms (such as R&D vouchers, tax relief on R&D or on investment in new equipment, etc.) 
policymakers increasingly support the creation of networks among firms and other types of 
organizations. Examples of R&D policies where public support is granted to networks of 
cooperating organizations, rather than to individual beneficiaries, are the EU Framework 
Programmes, which have been taking place for almost three decades (Breschi and Malerba, 
2009; Tindemans, 2009). But an increasing amount of national and regional policies directed 
at innovation networks (R&D consortia, R&D JVs) have been launched in the past decade or 
so, in Europe and elsewehere (Hagedoorn et al, 2000; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002; 
Caloghirou et al, 2004; Cunningham and Ramlogan, 2012). 
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The stated objectives of policies supporting the setup of innovation networks are usually to 
realize joint R&D, technological development or technology transfer projects or even, 
sometimes, networking per se (with a view to create a “critical mass” of experts or users in a 
certain discipline or technological area, as in the networks of excellence funded in the EU 
FPs 6 and 7). At the same time, policy interventions that provide resources for the setup of 
networks among different organizations may also contribute to improving the participants’ 
ability to perform collaborative innovation, by allowing them to gain experience in 
networking with external partners and in collaborating with them on a specific activity. While 
achieving such “behavioural” effects is not generally considered the main objective of these 
policies, they could constitute important outcomes, since they have the potential to generate 
long-lasting beneficial changes in the participants’ competences and abilities (Clarysse et al, 
2009; Duso et al, 2010). 
The analysis of the learning effects of policy interventions in support of innovation networks 
fits, indeed, with the recent debate on the investigation of policies’ “behavioural 
additionality” effects. The concept of behavioural additionality was introduced by Buisseret, 
Cameron and Georghiou (1995) with regard to the effect of a policy intervention on a firm’s 
(or another organization’s) way of undertaking R&D, in opposition to the established concept 
of output additionality, which simply captured a policy’s effect on the amount of R&D that 
an organization engaged in. Over time, the concept has been expanded and refined, for 
example by Georghiou (1998) who added the idea that these changes should be permanent in 
character and should allow for a more efficient innovation performance (see Gok and Edler, 
2012, for a review of studies on the concept of behavioural additionality). Within the broad 
realm of behavioural additionality, more specific concepts have also been introduced to 
capture particular kinds of behavioural changes induced by policy interventions, such as 
“network additionality”, intended as the ability of public funding instruments to increase 
networking and co-operation to a greater extent than would be present without such funding 
(Hyvarinen and Rautiainen, 2007), and  “cognitive capacity additionality” to capture the 
increase in an organization’s capabilities to engage in successful innovation (Bach and Matt, 
2002, 2005).  
While there has been some recent interest in the behavioural effects of policies in support of 
innovation networks (Fier, Aschhoff and Löhlein, 2006; Chávez, 2011; Caloffi, Russo and 
Rossi, 2012) the field is still relatively new. In particular, an important question for policy 
design is what kind of networks should be supported, if the objective of the policy is not just 
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to fund “successful” innovation projects, but also to increase the participants’ ability to 
engage in collaborative innovation. Should policies simply provide funding to innovation 
networks on the basis of an assessment of the project they intend to realize, or should they 
promote the setup of networks with specific features, in order to increase the agents 
innovative potential through networking? 
Many of the policies that we observe in practice require the participants to comply with a 
number of “relational” features that are seen as conducive to successful collaborative 
innovation. For instance, most of the policies targeting SMEs try to encourage their 
collaboration with academia or other research centres. For this reason, the presence of a 
minimum number of small firms and universities is often required.  However, the 
implications in terms of policy design may not be so straightforward. In fact, imposing 
specific requirements on networks “by design” may be counterproductive, encouraging 
participants to comply with rules that may not meet their specific needs and, ultimately, may 
decrease their opportunities for learning and networking. 
In this study, we analyse a specific policy in order to investigate whether imposing 
constraints on the design of innovation networks can improve the participants’ ability to 
engage in collaborative innovation. We use a rich dataset on all the organizations 
participating in a set of regional policy programmes implemented in the Italian region of 
Tuscany between 2002 and 2008. Some of these programmes imposed certain compulsory 
requirements on the composition of the innovation networks to be funded (specifically in 
terms of the size of the partnerships and of the types of organizations that they should 
include), while other programmes did not impose any constraints thereby leaving the 
participants’ free to organize their partnerships according to their needs. In comparing the 
two different groups of programmes, we will try to analyse the effects of policy constraints 
upon the ability to engage in subsequent collaborative innovation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the rationale underpinning 
the imposition of policy constraints in the formation of innovation networks. In section 3, we 
present our data. In section 4, we present our empirical analysis, and in section 5 we 
conclude. 
 
2. Policy constraints and collaborative innovation 
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Our objective is to assess whether the requirement that networks comply with certain 
structural constraints enhances the innovative capabilities of the organizations involved in 
such networks. We do so by studying the case of the regional innovation policy programmes 
implemented by Tuscany’s regional government between 2002 and 2008.  
In these policy interventions, two key types of constraints were imposed: heterogeneity 
constraints, when a minimum degree of variety in the composition of the partnership was 
made compulsory (in particular, the specific nature of the organizations that should have been 
involved in the partnership was specified); and minimum size constraints, when a minimum 
number of partners (larger than that mandated by the heterogeneity constraint) was required. 
These constraints were in line with the policymaker’s main objectives in facilitating the 
formation of partnerships, which were: (i) to promote the realization of successful innovation 
processes and (ii) to support learning processes on the part of the participants and in 
particular on the part of SMEs. In fact, in the policymakers’ intentions, the heterogeneity 
constraints were instrumental in creating connections between organizations that would not 
have otherwise collaborated and in promoting the diffusion of knowledge and technology to 
those organizations that were considered as weaker elements in the regional innovation 
system: by requiring that networks involved both knowledge-intensive organizations 
(universities, KIBS, public and private research centres) and partners that were less 
knowledge-intensive and less accustomed to engaging in collaborative innovation (micro 
enterprises and SMEs), the policymaker was hoping to foster the transfer of advanced 
technologies and organizational knowledge from the former to the latter. The minimum size 
constraints were expected to induce those organizations that were already collaborating with 
others (that is, organizations that were already part of established networks) to open up their 
partnerships to new organizations, preventing them from locking into stable and closed 
communities. 
We can expect constraints to have both negative and positive effects on learning. On the one 
hand, constraints may have a negative effect on learning, as they impose an additional layer 
of rules that may be misaligned with the participants’ actual needs. If such rules are 
irrelevant, they may simply increase transaction costs in the process of network formation. 
But such rules may even be detrimental, if they hamper the networks’ innovative 
performance and learning processes. For example, the heterogeneity constraint may require 
the involvement of a type of organization that is not necessary for the success of the project, 
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and which may even have an adverse impact on it. Another example is that the minimum size 
constraint may require the involvement of a large number of partners that create congestion 
and hamper communication, thus reducing performance. 
On the other hand, constraints may be instrumental in enhancing the participants’ ability to 
engage in further collaborative innovation. By participating in relatively large and 
heterogeneous networks, organizations may become acquainted with a variety of partners 
(who can provide them with further networking opportunities) and they may gain experience 
in engaging in and managing relationships with agents characterized by different 
competencies, cognitive frames and modes of operation. These processes may increase the 
participants’ likelihood to engage in subsequent collaborations, and to form heterogeneous 
and large collaborations. In the next section of the paper we analyse whether policy 
constraints have had an impact on the participants’ collaborative innovation capabilities by 
focusing precisely on these aspects – the ability to form new networks and the ability to form 
more heterogeneous and larger networks – as evidenced by the participants’ involvement in 
subsequent policy-supported innovation networks. 
 
3. The regional policy programmes 
3.1. Programmes and participants 
The empirical analysis focuses on a set of recent policies supporting networks of innovators 
implemented by the regional government of Tuscany. This regional government has been one 
of the most active promoters of innovation network policies in Italy, with a succession of 
tenders supported by European Regional Development funds (ERDF) since the early 2000s 
(Russo and Rossi, 2009; Bellandi and Caloffi, 2010). In particular, in the programming 
period 2000-2006 it promoted nine consecutive waves of four policy programmes aimed at 
supporting innovative projects carried out by networks of organizations
1
. These policy 
initiatives were addressed to a regional economic context characterized by the prevalence of 
                                                          
1
 We consider the following policy programmes: the Regional Programme of Innovative Action (RPIA) 
implemented in 2002 (ITT – Technological Innovation in Tuscany), the RPIA implemented in 2006 (VINCI – 
Promoting innovation networks and virtual organisations), and two lines of the Single Programming Document 
of the Region, namely the line 1.7.1 and the line 1.7.2. All these programmes have promoted the formation of 
innovation networks (the emphasis on innovation networks was given by the presence of such term in all 
programmes’ title). In particular, the programmes were aimed at funding innovative projects implemented by 
consortia involving firms and other types of organisations. The duration of each consortium (and the activity of 
the network of agents that composed it) coincided with the duration of the funded project.    
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SMEs with little R&D activity, often operating in sectors affected by harsh international 
competition. In order to promote the upgrading of these firms’ innovation skills and the 
adoption and marketing of the main outputs of the innovative projects within the regional 
context, the regional government supported the development of non-transitory forms of 
collaboration among micro enterprises, SMEs, large firms, universities, research centres, 
business services providers and other organizations such as innovation centres acting as 
intermediaries. 
Overall, the nine waves were assigned almost € 37 million, representing around 40% of the 
total funds spent on innovation policies in that programming period. Half of these funds were 
assigned to waves funded at 100% (non-repayable subsidies), while the rest was administered 
through co-funding (with shares of non-repayable subsidies ranging from 75% to 85% of 
admissible costs). Through the nine waves, 168 projects were funded, and carried out in the 
years 2002-2008. 
In our analysis we shall consider only the funded projects
2
. The total amount of different 
organizations involved in the nine waves was 1,127
3
, a subset of which (348) had taken part 
in more than one project. Since many waves allowed multiple participations (each 
organization could participate in more than one project), the number of participations 
amounted to 2,006
4
.  
Table 1 shows the numbers and shares of participations and organizations involved in the 
programmes, classified into nine categories according to their nature: firms, business service 
providers (generally private companies); private research companies; local (business) 
associations; universities (and other public research providers); innovation centres (generally 
publicly funded or funded via public-private partnerships); chambers of commerce; local 
governments; and other public bodies.  
                                                          
2
 See Russo and Rossi (2009) for a comparative analysis of funded and not funded project applications 
submitted to the RPIA_ITT programme. 
3
  The data refer to definitive projects, drafted in the format scheduled in the funding specifications. Our analysis 
includes all the subcontractors that have been explicitely identified in the application forms.  
4
 On average, the funds and the number of participants per project range from slighty less than 27 thousand 
euros and 5 participants in the wave 2004 of the policy programme 1.7.1 (a line of the regional Single 
Programming Document aimed at promoting the formation of R&D networks), to almost 1.5 million euros for 
35 participants in the only project in the wave 2002 of the same  programme 1.7.1. 
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Firms
5
 represented 45,6% of overall participations, and a larger share of participating 
organizations, but they had the smallest ratios of participations per capita (number of 
participations divided by the number of organizations).  
The last column of table 1 shows the average funding per type of funded organization, taking 
into account that not all of them were permitted to receive funding (large companies and 
organizations based outside the region could enter the projects only with their own 
resources). Innovation centres on average received more funds than all other types of 
participants, followed by universities and chamber of commerce. 
Table 1. Participants, agents and funding by type of organization 
 Type of organization Participations 
Participating 
organizations 
Total funding 
Average 
funding per 
organization 
  n. % n. % € % €  
Firm 914 45.6 680 60.3 13,348,181 36.3 19,630 
University  261 13.0 93 8.3 73,55,106 20.0 79,087 
Private research company  32 1.6 22 2.0 537,613 1.5 24,437 
Innovation centre  150 7.5 34 3.0 6,208,052 16.9 182,590 
Business service provider  153 7.6 86 7.6 4,015,642 10.9 46,694 
Local government  176 8.8 77 6.8 691,654 1.9 8,983 
Local association  209 10.4 85 7.5 3,016,694 8.2 35,491 
Chamber of commerce  49 2.4 11 1.0 802,151 2.2 72,923 
Other public body  62 3.1 39 3.5 815,448 2.2 20,909 
Total 2,006 100.0 1,127 100.0 36,790,543 100.0 32,645 
 
In terms of economic activity (based on Nace Rev. 1.1 codes) and size
6
, the largest share of 
participating enterprises were manufacturing companies (68%): of these, 21.8% were micro 
and small firms in the traditional industries of the region (marble production and carving, 
textiles, mechanics, jewellery. The remaining ones were micro firms in the service sector 
(Nace Rev. 1.1:72): these were an active group, with 1.8 projects each on average.  
The various programmes addressed a set of technology/industry targets. A large share of 
funds was devoted to ICT and multimedia (48.2%), with the objective to widen their adoption 
in traditional industries and SMEs. Projects in opto-electronics, an important competence 
network in the region, received 16.4% of funds. The third targeted area, projects in 
mechanics, received 7.5% of funds. The remaining technological fields included organic 
                                                          
5
 Overall, 680 enterprises were involved in one or more of the policy programmes. They are about 1% of the 
enterprises active in the region in 2001. 
6
 Enterprises are grouped by size into four classes: micro-sized firms (less than 10 employees); small firms (10-
40 employees); medium-sized firms (50-249 employees); large firms (more than 249 employees). 
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chemistry (5%), biotech (4%), and others (new materials, nanotechnologies and a 
combination of the previously mentioned technologies). 
The regional policymakers were very active in providing learning opportunities for the 
participants. In all the observed programmes, and particularly until 2006, participants were 
frequently invited to present their progress in programme meetings, which often included - in 
addition to project participants and the programme managers - external experts discussing 
particular features of the programmes or presenting best practices. 
Besides monitoring the projects’ progress, and teaching the policy participants how to 
manage the different aspects of the projects (from administrative procedures to external 
communication and dissemination), these meetings served to strengthen networking. In fact, 
the meetings (approximately one every four months) were used to exchange information on 
the innovative skills possessed by the various participants, the technologies developed and 
used in the projects, the sector of application of such technologies. The participation of all 
project partners – and not just the leading partner – was highly recommended. Moreover, in 
order to maximize the diffusion of information, the regional administration funded the 
publication of the final project reports, to be distributed to participants in the various 
programmes and in public events. 
The programme meetings were intended to facilitate the recombination of skills and 
knowledge possessed by the regional agents and thus facilitate the initiation of further 
innovation processes.  
 
 
 
3.2. Policy constraints 
The set of policy programmes can be divided into two major periods. The first period, which 
included the majority of waves and participants, ran from 2002 to 2005 (the last projects were 
completed towards the end of 2006), and absorbed 45% of the resources for the network 
policies. It included three programmes, divided into six waves: the Regional Programme of 
Innovative Action issued in 2002 (labelled as 2002_ITT in what follows); the SPD line 171 – 
‘programme 1.7.1’ – launched in 2002 (2002_171), in 2004 (two waves: 2004_171 and 
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2004_171E, targeting environmental protection technologies), in 2005 (2005_171); the SPD 
line 172 – ‘programme 1.7.2’ – issued in 2002 (2002_172). In the vision of policymakers, all 
these programmes should have led to the development and strengthening of innovation 
clusters made of SMEs and large companies working together with innovation service 
providers, universities and other agents supporting innovation. Strongly inspired by the 
regional innovation system framework – which was dominant in the European innovation 
strategies of the time – the regional policymaker considered the emergence of such clusters as 
the first step towards the formation of an innovation system in Tuscany. 
The second period started in 2006, and ended with the last intervention implemented in 2008. 
It included two programmes, divided into three waves: the Regional Programme of the 
Innovative Action issued in 2006 (2006_VIN), and the waves 2007 and 2008 of the 
programme 171 (2007_171 and 2008_171). The policymaker’s goal was to consolidate the 
networks formed in the previous period. Interestingly, these interventions had not been 
planned at the beginning of the programming period: the regional administration was able to 
procure additional funds that enabled it to implement a further RPIA and two more waves of 
the SPD line supporting innovation networks (programme 1.7.1).  
Out of the six waves launched in the first period (2002-2005), five were characterized by the 
imposition of several constraints which were not present in any of the waves in the second 
period (2006-2008). Table 2 below shows the types of constraint characterizing the different 
waves: whether the programme demanded a certain composition of the partnership in terms 
of types of organizations involved (henceforth “heterogeneity constraint”), and whether the 
programme demanded a minimum number of partners, greater than that implied by the 
heterogeneity constraint (henceforth “minimum size constraint”). Some of these programmes 
also required organizations to participate in no more than one or two different projects, a 
constraint (not shown in Table 2) whose effects we do not investigate in this study. 
Table 2. Types of constraints in the different waves 
Wave 
Policy 
programme 
Type of constraints: 
Minimum 
size of the 
partnership 
Minimum number of: 
SMEs 
Research 
org. 
Innovation 
centres 
Local 
governments 
2002_ITT RPIA 2002 6 4 1 
  
2002_171 SPD line 171 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2002_172 SPD line 172 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2004_171 SPD line 171 4 1 
   
 12 
2004_171E SPD line 171 
     
2005_171 SPD line 171 10 5 1 
 
1 
2006_VIN RPIA 2006 
     
2007_171 SPD line 171 
     
2008_171 SPD line 171           
Note to table 2: The first column displays the nine waves considered. The Regional Programmes of Innovative 
Action are identified with the following labels: 2002_ITT (Regional Programme of Innovative Action issued in 
2002, whose acronym was ITT – Tuscany Technological Innovation) and 2006_VIN (acronym: Virtual 
Innovation Networks and Cooperative Integration, issued in 2006). The different calls of the two lines 1.7.1 and 
1.7.2 included in the Single Programming Document are identified with the name of the line and of the 
reference year, as identified by the administrative documents we have analysed. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
The presence of a set policy-imposed constraints allows us to test whether the constraints  
had some impact on the participants’ learning processes, influencing the development of their 
ability to engage in collaborative innovation. Our dataset has two major limitations:. First, it 
does not allow us to extend the analysis to behavioural effects going beyond the period of 
implementation of the policy interventions themselves, in order to investigate whether and 
how the participants’ collaborative innovation skills have improved. Second, we do not have 
a control group of organizations that were not involved in the policy intervention, which 
could provide the basis for a counterfactual analysis. Because of the lack of data on the 
behaviour of participants after the end of the policy programmes, we focus on the 
characteristics of their participation in policy programmes in the second period (2006-2008) 
as evidence of their development of collaborative innovation skills. To compensate for the 
lack of an external control group, our empirical strategy involves distinguishing the effects of 
participation in programmes with and without policy constraints in the first period on the 
organizations’ behaviour in the second period: since most programme in the first period did 
impose constraints, we have developed measures capturing the intensity, rather than just the 
presence, of constraints, as will be described in greater detail in the next section 
First, we begin by describing whether the imposition of constraints is related to the key 
dimensions that each constraint was designed to impact. That is, we observe whether: (i) the 
heterogeneity of project networks was on average higher in programmes characterized by the 
requirement of a minimum degree of heterogeneity in the partnerships; (ii) programmes (here 
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and in what follows used as a synonym of waves) which imposed a minimum size constraint 
resulted in larger project networks. We also observe whether there were any significant cross-
cutting effect between the constraints and the relevant variables (e.g., whether the presence of 
a heterogeneity constraint had an effect on the networks’ average size, and whether the 
presence of a minimum size constraint had an effect on the networks’ average heterogeneity). 
We measure the heterogeneity of each project network in terms of the diversity of the types 
of participants: the index we use is the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index computed on the 
shares of participants belonging to each of nine categories (as listed in Table 1). The size of a 
network is measured by the number of participating organizations. 
Table 3. Relationship between policy constraints and the key dimensions they were designed to impact 
 Type of constraint: 
 
Minimum 
heterogeneity  
No minimum 
heterogeneity 
Minimum size  No minimum size 
Programmes 
2002_ITT, 
2002_171, 
2002_172, 2005_171 
2004_171E, 
2006_VIN, 
2007_171, 2008_171 
2002_ITT, 
2002_171, 
2002_172, 2004_171 
2005_171 
2004_171E, 
2006_VIN, 
2007_171, 2008_171 
N. 
organizations 
805 322 822 305 
Average 
network 
heterogeneity 
3.29 2.43 3.27 2.42 
t (p-value) -12.73 (0.00) -12.32 (0.00) 
Average 
network size 
20.44 7.9 20.17 7.94 
t (p-value) -30.69 (0.00) -28.46 (0.00) 
 
Table 3 shows that networks were on average more heterogeneous in programmes where a 
heterogeneity constraint was present than in programmes where such constraint was absent; 
and that networks were on average larger in programmes with minimum size constraints than 
in programmes without this constraint. At the same time, significant cross-cutting effects 
were also present: that is, networks were on average larger in programmes where a 
heterogeneity constraint was present than in programmes where such constraint was absent, 
and networks were on average more heterogeneous in programmes with minimum size 
constraints than in programmes without this constraint.  
The following figure 1 show the heterogeneity and size of networks in a scatter diagram that 
distinguishes between programmes with and without constraints. To compute the 
heterogeneity of each network we have used the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index computed 
on the shares of participants belonging to the different categories (as listed in Table 1), while 
the network size is defined in terms of number of participants. This representation shows that 
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the size and heterogeneity of networks were, on average, greater when constraints were 
present. In programmes without constraints, network size was generally smaller (consistently 
with the lack of a minimum size constraint) and, although network heterogeneity was on 
average lower, its variability was greater.   
Figure 1. Size and heterogeneity of project networks, grouped according to presence or absence of 
constraints 
 
 
Obviously, these comparisons do not tell us what are the effect of constraints. In fact, the 
features of networks in each programme may be influenced by many other elements besides 
policy constraints (the amount of funds available, the technology area the policy was 
designed to implement, the duration of the programme, and so on). Moreover, this approach 
does not allow us to distinguish between the effects of each constraint. In fact, while the 
constraints were strongly overlapping (programmes which imposed minimum heterogeneity 
also necessarily imposed a minimum size of the network) they had different intensity in 
different programmes (the minimum number of partners required ranged between 4 in 
programme 2004_171  and 10 in programme 2005_171, while the minimum heterogeneity 
required was lowest in programme 2004_171 and highest in programme 2002_171). The 
relationship between the intensity of the constraints in these five programmes was only 
loosely positive: the programmes that imposed a highest minimum size were not necessarily 
the programmes that imposed the highest heterogeneity, and vice versa programmes with low 
minimum size requirements may have had more strict heterogeneity constraints. 
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
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In what follows, we try to explore the effects of policy constraints on the behaviour of each 
organization rather than on the behaviour of networks of organizations. Therefore, we focus 
on the average heterogeneity and average size of all the networks an organization was 
involved in. For each organization, we average the heterogeneity indexes and the size of all 
the networks in which it took part, in either the first or the second period. The impact of 
constraints is also measured at the level of each organization: we compute the minimum 
heterogeneity requirements and the minimum size requirements of all the networks an 
organization participated in, and we average these across all such networks (only for projects 
funded within programmes where such constraints were present). 
To assess the impact of policy constraints on the organizations’ development of collaborative 
innovation capabilities, we run two different sets of models.  
First, we consider the 856 organizations that participated in programmes in the first period, 
and we assess whether policy constraints influenced the likelihood to participate also in the 
second period (Model 1). The dependent variable (T_20068) takes value 1 if the organization 
has participated in at least one project in the second period, and zero otherwise. Our 
hypothesis is that the policy constraints are likely to impact the actual heterogeneity and size 
of the networks the organization participated in during the first period, and these in turn are 
likely to affect the probability of its participation in the second period. To test this hypothesis 
we run a two-step instrumental variables probit regression (ivprobit) where the average 
heterogeneity and average size of networks in the first period (avghet_20025 and 
avgsize_20025) are instrumented by the variables representing the average minimum 
heterogeneity (avgminhet) and the average minimum size (avgminsize) of the projects the 
organization participated in, as mandated by the policy constraints.  We also include some 
variables capturing the organization’s pre-existing capabilities for collaborative innovation 
(the number of projects the organization participated in during the first period, 
Nprojects20025, and the average funding per project the organization was able to procure, 
avgfunding_20025), and we control for the organization’s type (out of nine possible 
categories, as indicated in Table 1; Chambers of Commerce is the reference category) and 
technological specialization (share of projects in each technology area). 
Secondly, we consider the set of 476 organizations that participated in the second period 
(2006-2008) and we examine whether having participated in projects in the first period that 
were characterized by the presence of policy constraints influenced three different 
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characteristics of an organization’s networks in the second period that capture the 
organization’s ability to engage in collaborative innovation: the number of projects, 
Nprojects20068 (Model 2), the average heterogeneity of projects, avghet_20068 (Model 3), 
and the average size of projects, avgsize_20068 (Model 4). Because of the different types of 
dependent variables, Model 2 is estimated with a Poisson model while Models 3 and 4 use 
OLS. Due to some missing data, the models are run on 460 observations. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the main descriptive statistics on the variables used in the models. 
Table 4. Variables used in Model 1 
 Number of observations: 856 
Variabile name Variable description Mean σ Min Max 
T_20068 (dependent 
variable) 
1 if organization participated in at least one 
project in period 2006-9, 0 otherwise 
0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
avgminhet 
Average minimum heterogeneity of projects 
as mandated by policy constraints 
1.64 0.38 0.00 2.00 
avgminsize 
Average minimum size of projects as 
mandated by policy constraints 
7.91 2.72 0.00 10.00 
avgdiversity_20025 
Average heterogeneity of networks the 
organization participated in during 2002-
2005 
3.37 1.01 1.18 5.95 
avgp_20025 
Average size of networks the organization 
participated in during 2002-2005 
21.02 7.48 3.00 36.00 
avgfunding_20025 
Average funding per project obtained by the 
organization in 2002-2005 
7738 16358 0 266425 
Nprojects20025 
Overall number of projects the organization 
participated in during 2002-2005 
1.53 1.34 1.00 14.00 
Ent Enterprise 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Opub Other public agency 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
LA Local business association 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
SC Innovation centre 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
LG Local government 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Uni University or PRO 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
SP Business service provider 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
shareICT Share of projects in ICT 0.54 0.45 0.00 1.00 
shareOpto Share of projects in optoelectronics 0.12 0.31 0.00 1.00 
shareMEch Share of projects in mechanics 0.06 0.19 0.00 1.00 
shareOrgChem Share of projects in organic chemistry 0.06 0.22 0.00 1.00 
shareBiotech Share of projects in biotechnology 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
shareNew Share of projects in new technologies 0.06 0.20 0.00 1.00 
shareMulti Share of projects in multiple areas 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00 
shareNano Share of projects in nanotechnology 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00 
shareGeo Share of projects in geothermal energy 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00 
shareOther Share of projects in other areas 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 5. Variables used in Models 2, 3, 4 
 Number of observations: 460 
Variabile name Variable description Mean σ Min Max 
Nprojects20068 
(dependent variable 
in Model 2) 
Number of projects the organization 
participated in 2006-2008 
1.46 0.94 1.00 8.00 
avghet_20068 
(dependent variable 
in Model 3) 
Average minimum heterogeneity of 
projects as mandated by policy 
constraints 
2.65 1.10 1.00 6.76 
avgsize_20068  
(dependent variable 
in Model 4) 
Average size of networks the 
organization participated in during 
2006-2008 
9.04 3.34 2.00 18.00 
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avgminhet 
Average minimum heterogeneity of 
projects as mandated by policy 
constraints 
0.74 0.87 0.00 2.00 
avgminsize 
Average minimum size of projects as 
mandated by policy constraints 
3.67 4.45 0.00 10.00 
Nprojects20025 
Overall number of projects the 
organization participated in during 
2002-2005 
1.08 1.89 0.00 14.00 
avgfunding_20068 
Average funding per project obtained 
by the organization in 2006-2008 
29791 72245 0 1411738 
Ent Enterprise 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Opub Other public agency 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
LA Local business association 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
SC Innovation centre 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
LG Local government 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Uni University or PRO 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
SP Business service provider 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
shareICT Share of projects in ICT 0.54 0.43 0.00 1.00 
shareOpto Share of projects in optoelectronics 0.08 0.25 0.00 1.00 
shareMEch Share of projects in mechanics 0.10 0.24 0.00 1.00 
shareOrgChem Share of projects in organic chemistry 0.03 0.13 0.00 1.00 
shareBiotech Share of projects in biotechnology 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 
shareNew Share of projects in new technologies 0.03 0.13 0.00 1.00 
shareMulti Share of projects in multiple areas 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
shareNano Share of projects in nanotechnology 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.50 
shareGeo Share of projects in geothermal energy 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
shareOther Share of projects in other areas 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
 
4.3. Empirical results 
Table 6 reports the results of Model 1. The first-stage regressions on the variables 
avghet_20025 and avgsize_20025 show that policy constraints significantly influence the 
heterogeneity and size of the networks each organization participates in: the variable 
avgminsize has a positive and significant coefficient in both cases, indicating that 
participating in networks that, on average, have higher minimum size requirements leads 
organizations to form larger and more heterogeneous networks. Instead, the variable 
avgminhet has a significant but negative coefficient in both cases, indicating that participating 
in networks that, on average, have higher minimum heterogeneity requirements leads 
organizations to form smaller and less heterogeneous networks. This is a counterintuitive 
result that we discuss in greater detail later. 
Table 6. Estimates for Model 1 
  First stage First stage Main equation 
Dependent 
Variable 
avghet_20025 avgsize_20025 T_20068 
  
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significance 
level 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significance 
level 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significance 
level 
avghet_20025 
    
-1.931 
 
  
    
(1.809) 
 
avgsize_20025  
    
0.352 
 
  
    
(0.276) 
 
avgminhet -0.886 *** -3.838 *** 
  
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.970) 
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avgminsize 0.257 *** 1.567 *** 
  
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.133) 
   
avgfunding_20025 0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 * 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Nprojects20025 -0.001 
 
-0.248 
 
0.552 *** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.111) 
 
Ent -0.424 ** 1.929 * -2.076 
 
 
(0.163) 
 
(1.137) 
 
(1.447) 
 
Opub 0.262 
 
3.150 ** -0.985 
 
 
(0.208) 
 
(1.450) 
 
(0.909) 
 
LA -0.094 
 
2.905 ** -1.690 
 
 
(0.181) 
 
(1.262) 
 
(1.183) 
 
SC 0.112 
 
5.323 *** -1.799 
 
 
(0.217) 
 
(1.510) 
 
(1.511) 
 
LG -0.217 
 
4.083 ** -2.751 
 
 
(0.184) 
 
(1.282) 
 
(1.687) 
 
Uni -0.079 
 
2.640 * -1.323 
 
 
(0.183) 
 
(1.274) 
 
(1.122) 
 
SP 0.295 
 
0.964 
 
0.293 
 
 
(0.185) 
 
(1.288) 
 
(0.758) 
 
shareICT 0.519 ** 4.608 ** -5.657 *** 
 
(0.273) 
 
(1.901) 
 
(1.165) 
 
shareOpto 0.059 
 
3.924 ** -6.328 *** 
 
(0.280) 
 
(1.950) 
 
(1.506) 
 
shareMEch 1.076 *** 0.704 
 
-2.710 
 
 
(0.301) 
 
(2.096) 
 
(2.058) 
 
shareOrgChem 0.322 
 
-5.446 ** -2.985 
 
 (0.302)  (2.100)  (2.520)  
shareBiotech 1.414 *** 1.596  -2.792  
 
(0.296) 
 
(2.060) 
 
(2.287) 
 
shareNew 0.726 ** -0.710 
 
-3.395 * 
 
(0.298) 
 
(2.077) 
 
(1.849) 
 
shareMulti 2.169 *** -1.714 
 
-0.057 
 
 
(0.356) 
 
(2.479) 
 
(4.508) 
 
shareNano 0.488 
 
5.013 ** -8.298 *** 
 (0.307)  (2.134)  (1.748)  
shareGeo 0.817 ** -7.760 *** 0.606  
 
(0.386) 
 
(2.690) 
 
(4.377) 
 
shareOther 0.045 
 
-5.594 ** -2.852 
 
 
(0.341) 
 
(2.376) 
 
(1.945) 
 
constant 2.485 *** 10.623 *** 3.779 ** 
  (0.328) 
 
(2.280) 
 
(1.741) 
 
 N. obs.  856 N. obs.  856 N. obs.  856 
 F 29.46 F  38.67 Chi2 77.81 
 Prob > F 0.000 Prob > F 0.000 Prob > Chi2 0.000 
 R-squared 0.425 R-squared 0.493 R-squared  
 Adj R-squared 0.411 Adj R-squared 0.48   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Wald test of exogeneity:     chi2(2) =     5.59           Prob > chi2 = 0.0612 
Firms are involved in less heterogeneous networks (the Ent variable in the first column has a 
significantly negative coefficient), while several technological areas are positively associated 
with heterogeneity (ICT, mechanics, biotech, new technologies, geothermal energy, multiple 
technologies). Organizations that capture larger funds, on average, are involved in larger 
networks (this can be seen from the significantly positive coefficient of the variable 
avgfunding_20025 in the second column) and so are various types of organizations (firms, 
other public agencies, local business associations, innovation centres, local governments, 
universities). Many technology area dummies also have a significant effect, indicating that 
the organization’s technological specialization affects the average size of the networks it 
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participates in (ICT, optoelectronics and nanotechnology are associated with larger networks, 
organic chemistry, geothermal energy and other technologies are associated with smaller 
networks).  
Concerning the main equation, neither greater heterogeneity nor greater size are associated 
with greater likelihood to participate in projects in the second period. Instead, subsequent 
participation is more likely if organizations have obtained more funds (variable 
avgfunding_20025) and have participated in more projects in the first period (variable 
Nprojects20025), variables that can indicate the presence of strong pre-existing collaborative 
innovation capabilities – that is, these were organizations that were already able to network 
successfully in order to procure public funds. The participation in a large number of projects 
in the first period may have further increased their collaborative innovation capabilities by 
providing them with more contacts and greater reputation as successful collaboration 
partners, as well as, possibly, better ability to write up project proposals. Therefore, while 
policy constraints appear to have influenced the heterogeneity and size of the funded 
networks, participating in more heterogeneous and larger networks did not in itself promote 
further successful participation; rather, it was pre-existing capabilities that influenced the 
likelihood to successfully bid for later programmes. 
The result that participation in programmes with tighter minimum heterogeneity constraints 
had a negative effect on the heterogeneity and size of the networks presented, can appear 
counterintuitive. A possible explanation for this apparently puzzling result is that the 
specification of more stringent constraint may have discouraged participants from including 
in their networks organizations that were different from the types recommended by the 
policymaker; that is, when confronted with very specific requirements, participants followed 
the guidelines for network composition quite closely and avoided adding other types of 
organizations. This, paradoxically, led them to form networks that were less heterogeneous 
and smaller than those they may have formed had the constraint been looser (or absent). This 
interpretation is consistent with the observation that in programmes where heterogeneity 
constraints were present there was less variability in the project networks’ heterogeneity 
indexes (see Figure 1) leading us to suggest that one of the effects of the heterogeneity 
constraints might have been to reduce the variety in the compositions of the different 
networks.   
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The results of Models 2, 3 and 4 are reported in Table 7. Here, we consider the set of 476 
organizations that participated in the second period (2006-2008) and we examine whether 
having participated in projects in the first period that were characterized by the presence of 
policy constraints influenced several characteristics of an organization’s networks in the 
second period: the number of projects it participated in, Nprojects20068 (Model 2), the 
average heterogeneity of its project networks, avghet_20068 (Model 3), and the average size 
of its project networks, avgsize_20068 (Model 4). Due to some missing data on the networks’ 
composition (16 observations are missing), the models are run on 460 observations.  
The results of Model 2 suggest that having participated in projects with minimum 
heterogeneity and size constraints did not influence the number of projects that the 
organization participated in during the second period: in fact, the coefficients of the variables 
avgminhet and avgminsize are not significant. Rather, pre-exisiting collaborative innovation 
capabilities (as proxied by the variable Nprojects20025) significantly and positively 
influenced the number of projects an organization participates in. Therefore, having 
participated in more projects in the first period increased not only the likelihood to participate 
in projects in the second period (as shown by Model 1) but also the number of projects an 
organization participated in.  Local governments and local business associations participated 
in fewer projects in the second period than other types of organizations. Organizations 
specializing in optoelectronics participated in more projects, and those specializing in biotech 
participated in fewer projects.  
Model 3 suggest that having participated in projects with minimum heterogeneity and/or 
minimum size constraints did not influence the average heterogeneity of projects in the 
second period. Having participated in a greater number of projects in the first period had a 
significantly negative effect on the heterogeneity of networks in the second period: That is, 
more experienced organizations ended up joining or forming less heterogeneous networks. 
This may suggest that organizations may not consider heterogeneity per se as a valuable 
attribute of project networks, but rather only value when it is indeed necessary for the 
project’s success: this is supported by the fact that in the programmes implemented in the 
second period, where no constraints were imposed, the networks’ composition was more 
variable (as shown in Figure 1). 
Some features of organizations (their type and technological area) also influence the 
heterogeneity of the networks they participate in. Local business associations, innovation 
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centres, local governments, universities and private business service providers are more likely 
to form heterogeneous networks: this is not surprising, as most of these organizations (in 
particular, local business associations, innovation centres and local government) consider 
building bridges with and across the local business community as one of their primary 
missions. Organizations specializing in biotech and new technologies are associated with 
more heterogeneous networks, while optoelectronics, organic chemistry, multiple 
technologies and the general “other technology areas” category are associated with less 
heterogeneous ones, following a similar pattern to that found in the first period (as shown in 
Model 1).  
Model 4 suggests that having participated in programmes with heterogeneity and size 
constraints in the first period did not influence the size of an organization’s project networks 
in the second period. Firms and organizations specialized in certain technology areas 
(optoelectronics, mechanics and biotechnology) were involved in larger networks, while 
organizations specializing in organic chemistry, geothermal energy, multiple technologies 
and other technologies participated in smaller networks. This pattern also shows some 
consistency with the pattern found in the first period (as shown in Model 1). From the 
previous Figure 1, we know that project networks in the second period were on average much 
smaller than in the first period, indicating that the minimum size constraints had indeed been 
effective in forcing organizations to form larger partnerships than they would have formed 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Estimates for Models 3, 4 and 5  
Dependent 
Variable: 
Nprojects20068 avghet_20068 avgsize_20068 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.)  
Significance 
level 
Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Significance 
level 
Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Significance 
level 
avgminhet 0.012  -0.313  0.036  
 0.142  0.296  0.922  
avgminsize 0.007  0.089  0.153  
 0.028  0.059  0.180  
avgfunding_2
0068 
0.000 ** 0.000  0.000  
0.000  0.000  0.000  
Nprojects200
25 
0.127 *** -0.057 ** 0.027  
0.013  0.026  0.091  
Ent -0.075  -0.001  1.471 *** 
 0.130  0.260  0.499  
 22 
Opub -0.153  0.736  0.323  
 0.159  0.456  1.041  
LA -0.336 ** 0.925 *** 0.355  
 0.155  0.300  0.733  
SC 0.096  0.723 ** 0.567  
 0.166  0.314  1.090  
LG -0.300 * 1.431 *** 1.018  
 0.158  0.330  0.629  
Uni 0.027  0.805 ** 0.869  
 0.143  0.299  0.637  
SP 0.196  0.541 * 0.622  
 0.148  0.317  0.650  
shareICT -0.044  -0.183  0.105  
 0.062  0.147  0.482  
shareOpto 0.288 *** -0.589 *** 1.797 *** 
 0.094  0.148  0.545  
shareMEch -0.043  0.100  2.425 *** 
 0.075  0.195  0.856  
shareOrgChe
m 
-0.009  -0.654 *** -2.297 ** 
0.160  0.251  0.972  
shareBiotech -0.240 *** 0.437 ** 4.230 *** 
 0.084  0.208  0.843  
shareNew -0.241  1.279 *** -0.719  
 0.146  0.347  0.822  
shareMulti -0.078  -1.620 *** -2.453 * 
 0.215  0.402  1.280  
shareNano -0.766  1.014  6.989  
 0.729  1.146  5.056  
shareGeo 0.549  -0.235  -4.459 *** 
 0.352  0.372  1.087  
shareOther 0.223  -0.513 ** -2.833 *** 
 0.176  0.256  0.857  
constant 0.230 * 2.411 *** 7.083 *** 
 0.136  0.283  0.613  
 N. obs. 460 N. obs. 460 N. obs. 460 
 chi2 94.98 F 7.878 F 5.601 
 Prob >Chi2 0.00 Prob >F 0.00 Prob >F 0.00 
 R-squared  0.077 R-squared  0.263 R-squared 0.203 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis has shown that the imposition of constraints on the size and 
composition of networks to be submitted for funding influenced the features of the networks 
that were actually formed, although not necessarily in the expected direction. If we consider 
the combined effect of the two types of constraints, as we did in the descriptive part of the 
analysis (section 4.1), we find that programmes having both minimum size and minimum 
heterogeneity constraints produced networks that were, on average, larger and more 
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heterogeneous than those in programmes without such constraints. However, the networks 
formed in programmes without constraints exhibited greater variability in terms of 
heterogeneity, suggesting that the imposition of constraints reduced the variability in the 
compositions of the partnerships.  
When (as we did in section 4.2) we separate the effects of minimum size and minimum 
heterogeneity constraints, and we take into account the fact that the constraints had different 
degrees of intensity (and the intensity of the two constraints was only loosely correlated) we 
find that the two constraints have had different impacts.  
The statistical models computed on different subsamples share a number of common 
findings. 
First of all, the network dimensions that are influenced by the policy constraints – 
heterogeneity and size – did not impact the organization’s likelihood to participate in projects 
in the second period nor the number of projects the organization participated in during the 
second period. 
Secondly, the variables proxying the acquisition of collaborative innovation capabilities were 
often influenced by the presence of characteristics indicating pre-existing collaborative 
innovation capabilities (such as the ability to procure more funds per project and the ability to 
submit more successful project applications). This suggests that, as could be expected, the 
organizations that already had strong capabilities to engage in collaborative innovation were 
better able to exploit the opportunities offered by these programmes. Having participated in 
more projects may have, in itself, promoted further collaborations by allowing organizations 
to get acquainted with a larger number of partners and to increase their reputation of 
“successful” collaborators. 
These findings suggest several concluding remarks with respect to the effectiveness of 
constraints in supporting learning processes on the part of organizations involved in policy 
initiatives. 
Some constraints – especially less restrictive ones like the simple imposition of a minimum 
size – can have the positive effect of encouraging organizations to form larger networks and 
hence interact with a larger number of organizations than they would not otherwise have 
partnered with. Although this does not necessarily translate in greater participation to 
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subsequent programmes or in the formation of more diverse or larger networks in the second 
period, these contacts may provide useful in other contexts and at future points in time.  
Instead, a more restrictive constraint like the minimum heterogeneity constraint appears to 
have had more controversial effects. Having participated in programmes with tighter 
heterogeneity constraints led organizations to form less heterogeneous and smaller networks. 
The argument here is that very specific constraints were interpreted by participants as being 
akin to “guidelines” that should be followed in order to bid successfully; hence, in 
programmes with strict heterogeneity constraints the compositions of projects networks were 
more similar to each other, and reflected quite closely the minimum composition required by 
the policymaker. Paradoxically, imposing more heterogeneity “by design” led participants to 
form less heterogeneous and smaller networks as they simply followed the indications 
provided. Instead, looser (or even absent) heterogeneity constraints led participants to include 
the variety of organizations that they actually needed to realize their projects, producing 
greater variability in network composition and, on average, greater heterogeneity.  
The problem with the ex ante definition of very specific heterogeneity constraints is that, 
while there is a general consensus on the benefits of heterogeneous networks, the nature of 
the agents that may best contribute to the partnership very much depends on the content of 
the project that the network intends to realize. Hence, the definition of specific constraints 
may force participants to include organizations whose involvement is not needed for the 
purposes of the project, creating unnecessary complications. Furthermore, rigid rules may 
even discourage participants from experimenting with more varied approaches. 
Together, these findings suggest that collaborative innovation capabilities are gained over a 
longer time span than the duration of individual programmes, and that the imposition of 
simple constraints on network structure is not sufficient to ensure the acquisition of such 
skills. This is particularly true for projects that have small scale and short duration such as the 
ones we have analyzed. In order to support organizations’ capabilities to engage in 
collaborative innovation, strategies other  than the imposition of constraints on network 
structure may be more productive: for example, implementing outreach actions in order to 
encourage organizations to participate in more policy supported innovation networks, and 
designing additional measures in order to increase the organizations’ learning opportunities 
(providing opportunities to meet other organizations, facilitating meetings between different 
types of organizations, providing opportunities for joint action, and so on).  
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